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INTRODUCTION
The realist tradition in world politics has long been
heralded by statesmen and scholars alike as offering an
authentic account of the relations between states.
Thucydides, exploring the roots of conflict between
ancient Athens and Sparta, pointed to the inevitable
growth of power and self-interest as a cause of war. 1
Niccolo Machiavelli suggested prudent leaders ought to
resort to imperialism and war.

Anarchy, he suggested,

requires the prince to violate ethical principles in
defense of the state. 2

Thomas Hobbes acknowledged that

international anarchy produces a disposition towards
competition and war. 3

In 19th century Prussia, Otto von

Bismarck and Carl von Clausewitz legitimized the use of
war as an extension of diplomacy. 4
Twentieth-century realists have continued the
tradition.

Studying Germany's rise to power in the years

prior to W.W.II, E.H. Carr condemns the appeasement
philosophy of many European nations. 5

Hans Morgenthau

reminds the student of world politics that power and selfinterest lie at the heart of the state. 6

Hedley Bull

suggests an underlying logic to anarchy and warns against
alternative world organizations. 7
This pessimistic view of the political struggle
between states depicts the foundation upon which realism,
as the dominant paradigm in international relations
theory, rests.

It characterizes the anarchic environment

as a struggle for power by self-interested, sovereign
states.

International politics is competitive, war-prone,

and brutal.

Conflict is the norm, and cooperation, the

exception. 8
Others suggest this view is too pessimistic.

They

contend that cooperation appears to develop relatively
easily among self-interested states. 9

Wars, although

possible, are interrupted by long periods of amicable
relations between states.

Cooperation consistently occurs

in the form of accepted legal norms, economic agreements,
and international humanitarian missions. 10
Theorists who stress cooperation and order are
inclined toward a more benign picture of international

2

politics, quite removed from the traditional realist
perspective.

At the end of W.W.I, liberal statesmen and

scholars envisioned that politics in the future would be
marked by concord and "perpetual peace." 11

Leaders after

W.W.II established the United Nations and proclaimed a new
era for humankind.u

As economic cooperation progressed

through the 1970's, "neoliberal institutionalism" examined
the rise of institutions (international organizations,
regimes, and other supranational entities) as a means of
ensuring global cooperation. 13

These neoliberals

proclaimed that a paradigm shift was occurring, and
announced their institutional perspective as the new
candidate. 14
Which view correctly described world politics?

Could

realist philosophy maintain its 2000 year old tradition of
dominance?

Realists of various persuasions attempted to

bolster the state-centric, power-politics model.

Rebuffed

by the continuous attacks of institutionalists, it
appeared that a fundamental change in the study of the
global system was underway.

Finally, Kenneth Waltz

introduced a systemic theory of international politics. 15

3

Termed, neorealism, Waltz's account of the politics
between nations borrowed a structural framework from
oligopolistic theory in economics. 16
Traditional realist thought, according to Waltz, was
reductionist.

It reduced the study of international

relations to the internal attributes of the state or the
psychological make-up of the citizenry. 11

Reliance on

ideas such as "human nature," "national character," and
"legal ideals,

1118

all point to discussions around states

and their internal characteristics.

For, Waltz, such

theories could not adequately explain state behavior.
Therefore, in Theory of International Politics, he applied
a systemic approach to the study of international
relations.

Analogous to oligopic market theory, where

competition and self-help reign, Waltz's theory was a
marked change from the traditional realist school.

The

discipline was introduced to new concepts, like system and
structure. 19

Systems are conceptual tools that theorists

use to study actors. 20
units.

1121

A system is a "set of interacting

Structures are bounded realms of actors.

4

As

defined by Waltz, the international structure consists of
states, varying in strength, interacting in anarchy. 22
For many in the discipline, neorealism rose from the
ashes of traditional realist thought and reclaimed the
title of dominant paradigm.

By maintaining the importance

of power, anarchy, self-interest, and the state,
neorealism would be indelibly linked to its predecessor.
However, with its systemic dimension, it would be powerful
enough to explain economic cooperation.

Subsequent

attempts at explaining these matters by employing
neorealist theory met with critical success. 23

Combined

with the traditional realist ability to explain discord,
neorealism appeared able to stave off the
institutionalists.
Ironically, in the same decade that bore neorealism,
several international environmental agreements were signed
introducing the emergence of a new issue area in the study
of international relations. 24

The increasing salience of

environmental issues has provided many theorists with the
opportunity to raise the specter of a paradigm shift once
again. 25

Institutionalists now claim that the

5

oligopolistic analogy in neorealism, tolerable for
explaining economic matters, does not sufficiently explain
environmental cooperation. 26

Various institutional theories have attempted to
account for the relative success of many prominent
international environmental agreements. 27

Individually

and collectively, these works provide a strong counterresponse to neorealism. 28

Currently, it appears that the

discipline is once again wrought with paradigm
competition.

Awkward claims that issues such as

environmental cooperation matter little in a world
dominated by nuclear weapons, 29 only add to neoliberal
claims.

Consider, for example, that Kenneth Waltz's

seminal piece, Theory of International Politics, lacks any
in-depth mention of environmental issues. 30
This project undertakes to expand neorealism's
ability to explain state behavior in the area of
environmental cooperation.

I seek to demonstrate that

international environmental agreements appear to be
influenced by the distribution of power in the
international system. 31

Specifically, I contend that the

6

international anarchical structure, and its ramifications
for state actors, sufficiently explains the success or
failure of international environmental agreements.

Anarchy, described as a self-help system, 32 mandates the
need for state actors to cooperate on certain
environmental issues, while that same system dissuades
cooperation on a number of other important environmental
matters.

As states seek to survive in the anarchical

order, cooperation, often more apparent than real,

33

is

engendered.
In order to construct a structural explanation of
environmental cooperation, I shall first critique the
institutionalists' perspective.

This will provide insight

into the limited ability of neoliberalism to account for
environmental cooperation.

Further, this critique will

suggest a more modest role for international institutions,
a role that can be explained through the lens of
neorealism.
Second, I will enhance the current ability of
neorealism to account for cooperation.

Frequent attacks

on the paradigm suggest that its deterministic structure 34

7

does not allow for a great deal of cooperative behavior.
In response to such criticisms, I shall present a
theoretical case for understanding cooperation through the
lens of neorealism.
Finally, a structural explanation of environmental
cooperation will be developed.

By surveying a number of

successful and unsuccessful environmental agreements, it
will be demonstrated that great powers, in order to ensure
their sovereign integrity, exercise their ability to
influence and co-opt other states.

Consequently, less

powerful states remain as incapable of influence on
environmental issues as they are in military and strategic
arenas.

8
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INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF COOPERATION
In the wake of a series of devastating oil spills
like that of the Torrey Canyon, and popular protest
movements like the inaugural Earth Day of 1971, 1 the
highly charged environmental debate entered the academic
arena.

Significant works appeared by highly praised

scholars denouncing the self-destructive path of humankind
and prescribing radical alternatives.
Falk published This Endangered Planet. 2

In 1971, Richard
This provocative

look at the effect humanity has on the global ecosystem
suggested the extreme measures that the species must take
in order to survive. 3

Richard Heilbroner, R. Buckminster

Fuller, and others 4 voiced similar opinions in response to
the perceived imminent doom facing humankind.
These early texts on the subject of the international
environment seem indelibly linked to the historical period
in which they were created.

The psycho milieu 5 of the

authors is colored by suggestions that the extinction of
the species was forthcoming.

This should not detract from
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their worth as outstanding intellectual achievements in
raising the collective conscience of humankind in order to
deal with serious environmental issues.
Nevertheless, these highly normative early works gave
way to more cautious analyses as the accumulation of
cooperative agreements increased at a rapid rate through
the 1970s. 6

More recent research on the environment has

involved close scrutiny of these agreements.'

With

recourse to data, theorists were able to establish
explanations of how and why cooperation, on a variety of
complex and difficult environmental matters, was possible.
Further, these more empirical works suggest that humankind
can achieve a reasonable degree of environmental integrity
without radical systemic change.

The resulting collection

represents a strong counter-response to the radical
economic and political alternatives expressed in the early
writings. 8
In 1977, Hedley Bull published a classic study of
international politics entitled The Anarchical Society. 9
This inquiry into order and stability in the international

16

arena suggests the importance of the state in minimizing
international conflict. 10
Unlike the early environmental theorists, who
suggested that order and cooperation must come at the
expense of the state, 11 Bull argues that the nation-state
system is an integral, indeed the integral, component of
order.

Applying this logic to environmental issues, Bull

suggests that the current state-centric system is the only
political structure presently able to deal with
environmental threats.

Concurring with Shields and Ott, 12

Hedley Bull notes that "it is only national governments
that have the information, the experience and the
resources to act effectively in relation to these
matters." 13

This analysis, then, provides a foundation

for studies on environmental cooperation that acknowledge
the importance of the nation-state system.
Both neoliberals and neorealists agree on the primacy
of the state in international politics. 14
relief for a great many theorists.

This is welcome

The similarity allows

for a more genuine comparison of the institutional role
within each paradigm.

17

Peter Haas, Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy provide a
thorough discussion of the state in their recent
compilation of articles under the rubric Institutions for
the Earth. 15

In the introductory chapter, these theorists

concern themselves with the importance of the nation-state
in establishing international environmental cooperation.
They suggest that institutions, which may take the form of
organizations, regimes, or conventions, 16 do not
supersede or overshadow states. They lack the
resources to enforce their edicts.
To be
effective, they must create networks over,
around, and within states that generate the
means and the incentives for cooperation among
those states. 17
These neoliberals emphasize their pragmatic nature, 18
and argue throughout their analyses that the state is
integral to cooperative ventures.

This state-centric

approach adheres closely to theoretical principles in
neorealism.

Kenneth Waltz is quick to point out the

presence of international processes in his own theory. 19
Process results from state interaction within the
international system.

For Waltz, processes take the form

of rules, institutions, and organizations. 20

18

Processes

are vibrant entities in international politics.

But, like

the neoliberals, Waltz considers their presence in
cooperative ventures to be secondary to the primary actors
in the system.

He argues,

States set the scene in which they, along with
nonstate actors, stage their dramas or carry on
their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose
to interfere little in the affairs of nonstate
actors for long periods of time, states
nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse,
whether by passively permitting informal rules
to develop or by actively intervening to change
rules that no longer suit them. When the crunch
comes, states remake the rules by which other
actors operate. 21

An almost identical viewpoint of the relationship
between institutional processes and the state is expressed
in Institutions for the Earth.

Haas, Keohane, and Levy

suggest that international institutions perform three
crucial functions that "have contributed to more effective
national efforts to protect the quality of the global
environment.

1122

Coining these elements "the three C's,"

the authors note that institutions increase government
concern, enhance the contractual environment, and increase
national capacity. 23

Having expressed this opinion, they

concede that,

19

if the rules and practices of international
institutions are inconsistent with realities of
power or ecology, they may become meaningless;
and if their content creates perverse
incentives, they may do more harm than good. 24
The limits of institutions are correctly demarcated
by these authors.

They emphasize the mirroring effect

that institutions have with power relationships in the
international system.

John Mearsheimer, writing in the

realist tradition, allows that states do utilize
institutions, however he is quick to point to the power
relationship as well,
Realists also recognize that states sometimes
operate through institutions. However, they
believe that those rules reflect state
calculations of self-interest based primarily on
the international distribution of power. The
most powerful states in the system create and
shape institutions so that they can maintain
their share of world power, or even increase it.
In this view, institutions are essentially
'arenas for acting out power relationships." 25
Other theorists who argue from the institutional
perspective are open about the power dimension in
international politics.

Oran Young suggests that the

creation of international regimes is often done in the
presence of, and with the encouragement of, an

20

"Imposed regimes, " 27 are a

international hegemon. 26

classic example of "power politics" manifested in an
international process.

These regimes are "fostered

deliberately by dominant powers or a consortia of dominant
powers." 28

Because the capability differential is so

great, less powerful states are compelled through "some
combination of coercion, cooptation, and manipulation of
incentives," 29 to obey the informal rules of the regime.
Karen Litfin echoes the regime analysis of Oran
Young.

She contends that regimes play an increasingly

important role in the development of international
environmental solutions. 30

However, she still considers

the state to be the primary international actor,
Only the state has the human and financial
resources to mount the large-scale scientific
and technical projects for detecting,
monitoring, and preserving the global
environment. 31
Neoliberals have also witnessed power manifested in
institutions while studying epistemic communities.

In

1990, Peter Haas published Saving the Mediterranean. 32
This book was a compilation of research dedicated to
understanding why Mediterranean states cooperated with

21

each other in solving marine pollution problems.
According to Haas, the motivating force behind
Mediterranean cooperation has been the "epistemic
community." 33

This community is a professional group

drawn from many different scientific disciplines. 34

The

members all share a common world view and a willingness
and desire to promote such values. 35

Haas suggests that

beyond their similar scientific history, these members
share a 'consensual knowledge' about how to solve
problems. 36
Although Haas considers the international scientific
community to have been the motivating force in
establishing the MEDPlan agreements, he adds important
qualif ers concerning the power distribution in the
Mediterranean region.

Acknowledging France's pre-eminent

role as an economic hegemon for many Mediterranean basin
countries, he concedes that,
Without active French participation, no efforts
to clean up the Mediterranean could hope to
succeed. Since the developing countries were
more dependent on French trade for contributions
to their GNP than France was dependent on them,
French negotiators were in a better position to
coerce compliance from LDC diplomats by way of
tacit threats of unilaterally implementing new
22

policies to control pollution. Thus, France
could expect to create pollution control
arrangements which would satisfy French
concerns. 37
Haas, turning his attention to the ozone depletion
issue, finds similar results with regard to United States
hegemony. 38

Arguing once again that epistemic analysis

provides a rich explanation of cooperation, Haas concedes
that U.S. influence was a necessary pre-condition for that
cooperation. 39
Legal institutionalists also maintain the primacy of
the state and the importance of the power distribution in
international environmental agreements. 40

While

introducing his edited volume, Greening International
Law, 41 Philippe Sands acknowledges that states "continue
to play the primary and dominant role in the international
legal order, both as principal creators of the rules of
international law and the principal holders of the rights
and obligations under those rules." 42
So far,

it would appear that neoliberals and

neorealists share similar views with regard to the
importance of both the state and power in the
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international system.

Nothing, to this point, in the

discussion of institutions by neoliberals contradicts the
theoretical principles in neorealism.

States remain the

key actors and institutions provide scientific information
and enhance the negotiating arena.

Indeed, Charles Glaser

has pointed out that neorealists have no problem with
institutions that merely reduce transaction costs and
provide information. 43

This type of institutional

analysis maintains the logic of neorealism. "States remain
the key actors, and anarchy remains unchanged; from this
perspective, the role played by these institutions is
modest. " 44

According to Glaser,

If institutions of this type would make
cooperation desirable, then structural realism
predicts that states would create them for
essentially the same reason that under certain
conditions they should pursue advances in
technology or increases in force size: these
policies would enhance their military
capabilities. 45
However, most neoliberals prescribe a more active
role for the institution in developing international
environmental cooperation. 46
begins to take place.

Here, a theoretical split

Increasingly, the view of the state
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as a passive participant in the institutional process
becomes clear.
This seriously undermines the importance of the state
and counters much of the self-help logic of neorealism.
Accordingly, many institutional analyses seek to explain
international environmental cooperation as the result of
regimes, organizations, and epistemic communities. 47
Karen Litfin provides an excellent example of just such an
explanation.

She asserts,

scientists and social movements have instigated
virtually all existing international
environmental agreements, and in many cases were
key actors in their negotiation, implementation,
and monitoring. Moreover, these non-state
actors are infusing new rules, processes, and
norms into both new and existing social
structures. 48
Peter Haas, whose earlier discussion of French
hegemony in the MEDPlan, suggested a realist bias, moves
away from the state-centric approach and insists that
The epistemic community approach offers
suggestions for more resilient cooperation that
is broader in scope than that anticipated by
realists, neorealists, and historical
materialists. 49
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Thus, the true explanation for successful
environmental cooperation in the Mediterranean basin
results from the active involvement of the international
epistemic community.

Neorealists become uneasy as this

explanation of cooperation unfolds.

This group, composed

of "bureaucrats, technocrats, scientists, and
specialists, " 50 must consider themselves members of that
community a priori their role as government officials.
Maintaining the importance of the state, realists argue
that these individuals are members of the apparatus known
as the state. 51
Categorizing these individuals as members of the
state, proffers an opposing explanation of their behavior.
As state agents these individuals have a desire to
maximize state interests. 52

The cooperative activities

they engage in result from an understanding that
environmental degradation can diminish the economic and
aesthetic interests of the state.

Realists insist that

the international system reflects this notion.

States

have not given up regulatory authority to international
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organizations and the monitoring functions of these
organizations are quite limited. 53
Further evidence of neoliberalism's intent to move
away from the state as the primary actor is provided by
the work of Haas, Keohane, and Levy. 54

Originally

introducing themselves as pragmatists, their subsequent
discussions seed the institutional dimension with an
activist aire.

In order to be effective, they suggest,

institutions must "create networks over, around, and
within states that generate the means and the incentives
for cooperation among those states." 55

Institutions are

given an international personality that makes the
neorealist uncomfortable.

John Mearsheimer, perhaps an

extreme critic of the role of institutions, defends the
realist argument succinctly,
Realists maintain that institutions are
basically a reflection of the distribution of
power in the world.
They are based on selfinterested calculations of the great powers, and
they have no independent effect on state
behavior. 56
While Mearsheimer is over-exuberant in his disdain of
institutions, he is not completely at fault.
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Neoliberals

provide him with the impetus for such a harsh critique by
implying that the state is either impotent to, or unaware
of, forces driving institutional

fabrication.~

Institutions are better understood if the they occupy
a more modest role in a theory of international politics.
Reformulating Haas, Keohane, and Levy's discussion to
read, states build institutional networks when the need
for such networks appears in the interest of the state,
provides for a more balanced account of the role of
institutions.

Institutional networks can then be

described as a process of state activity.

Additionally,

these processes will more accurately reflect the power
distribution and the desires of states.
By discounting the notion of self-interest in the
international system, neoliberal analyses often paint too
optimistic a picture of international cooperation.

Self-

interest and anarchy provide neorealism with an
explanation of state behavior.

Notions such as these,

provide answers as to why environmental cooperation
occurs.

Finding an explanation for cooperation,

neorealists can then enhance their theory by describing
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how that cooperation is formalized.
just such an enhancement.

Institutions provide

Neoliberals appear to confuse

the descriptive with the explanatory.
Perhaps some examples will shed some light on the
problem created by neoliberals.

Consider the recent

attempt to develop a comprehensive and thorough set of
legal agreements to deal with climate change.

In early

1991, officials from over 100 countries met in Washington
D.C. to convene the United Nations Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee on Climate Change (INC) . 58

States

concerned with rising sea levels and atmospheric change
used the forum to voice their opinions and lament the
uncooperative behavior of major world powers. 59
The most active group of states involved in this
issue, provides evidence of why a comprehensive set of
agreements has not been created.

Known as the Alliance of

Small Island States, 60 a host of nations in the Pacific,
Indian, and Atlantic Oceans 61 continuously demand action.
For neorealists, their overwhelming lack of power points
to their subsequent inability to achieve cooperation.
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However, for neoliberals focusing on the
institutional process, this group is described quite
differently.

Oran Young suggests that the Alliance has

achieved "real success within the
that,

INC."~

He considers

"[b]ecause the concerns of its members are so

palpable and because the group has attracted the help of
sophisticated advisors from the NGOs, the Alliance of
Small Island States has proven effective in the climate
negotiations, despite the weakness of its members in
material terms. " 63
Young seems to confuse internal institutional
cooperation among a variety of weak states and NGOs, with
international environmental cooperation.

There is an

implicit desire to establish non-governmental
organizations as influential in promoting cooperation.
However, what does it matter if the Alliance has proven
effective in the negotiations, if the negotiations do not
result in success?

Young concedes that,

"there is no way

to check global warming without the active participation
of the developing countries.""
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It pays to look beyond an

institutional perspective to understand cooperation or
lack thereof.
Recourse to simple and rather unattractive principles
such as anarchy and sufficient self-interest, 65 prove more
valuable than institutional explanations.

That

negotiations take place, and cursory scientific data is
collected, does not point to an impending set of
environmental agreements.

There is confusion created in

using institutions as explanations of why cooperation
takes place.

Much the same occurs in an institutional

analysis of the MEDPlan.
Throughout the 1970's, the newly formed United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) assisted in the
creation and maintenance of a regime to ensure the
environmental integrity of the Mediterranean Sea from a
host of pollutants. 66

Hailed as the "flagship" of UNEP' s

Regional Seas Initiatives, 67 the MEDPlan 68 is considered a
resounding success for the institutional model of
cooperation.
According to many in the academic and public-policy
communities, this set of agreements represents a
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"brilliant invention and a new contribution to the
resources of diplomacy. " 69

If these experts are correct,

then why have UNEP's other Regional Seas Initiatives not
qualified as similar successes?

After all, from the

institutional perspective, all necessary components for
cooperation should be present.

Indeed, subsequent

agreements should be easier since the institutional
infrastructure is already in place.

All things being

equal, agreements to protect the Red Sea, the Persian
Gulf, the Caribbean, etc. 70 should be relatively simple.
Unfortunately, subsequent agreements have largely
been cosmetic and have not involved measures necessary for
even limited environmental protection.

Tony Brenton

discusses the merits of UNEP's efforts as well as its
limitations,
The scale of this programme, and the number of
countries involved, is impressive evidence of
UNEP's ability to pull regional groupings of
countries together to discuss, and sign
agreements on, their local marine pollution
problems .... It is a great deal less clear,
however, how much the Regional Seas Programme
has actually done to begin to reverse marine
pollution, or to what extent it reveals a
willingness on the part of the participants to
make economic sacrifices to that end. With one
exception, the programmes undertaken so far seem
32

largely to be confined to generalized
expressions of the need to tackle pollution ...
There is little evidence of the emergence of
concrete regional programmes and standards
intended to cut polluting discharges into the
marine environment. 71
Ironically, it is unclear that the exception noted by
Brenton, the MEDPlan, has been as effective as many
authors insist. 72

Recent analysis of the MEDPlan suggests

that although it
is a model of success at getting disparate
states to come together to create legal
documents for the protection of the environment,
it may be considered less successful in getting
the parties to those documents to adopt and
implement policies that would actually carry out
the plan envisioned by the Convention and
subsequent Protocols." 73
Neoliberals seem unable to answer why there is a
discrepancy between envisioned and actual cooperation.

By

endowing the institution with a significant amount of
agency, their analysis should suggest no difference in the
level of cooperation called for by the international legal
framework and the level witnessed in the international
system.
On the other hand, by prescribing only a modest role
for the institution, neorealists need not be concerned
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with this discrepancy.

Maintaining the primacy of the

state, allows for an explanation of the level of
cooperation achieved, and a rationale for the difference
between envisioned and actual cooperation.

Still

maintaining that self-interest will dictate the level of
cooperation witnessed, these theorists expect to see
relatively modest forms of cooperation.

Limited

cooperation is a result of self-interest in an anarchic
environment. 74

States are not willing to involve

themselves in strict regulations that compromise their
drive to maintain capabilities. 75
This appears to answer why a lower level of
cooperation is achieved than initially called for by the
formal agreement.

However, it still remains a mystery as

to why, since states have control over institutions, there
should ever be a higher level of envisioned cooperation.
It is important to remember Waltz's cautious description
of the interaction between states and institutions.

He

recalls that states may not interfere with the activities
of institutions for extended periods of time. 76

However,

they "set the terms of the intercourse, whether by
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passively permitting informal rules to develop or by
actively intervening to change" 7 7 those rules.
If there is a minor discrepancy between envisioned
and actual cooperation, neorealists would suggest that
states are simply not concerned with it.

If this

discrepancy were to inhibit powerful state behavior, then
intervention into the institutional process would be
expected.

The rabid refusal by powerful states, to sign

the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
treaty 78 suggests such a scenario.

Because many of the

more 'progressive' articles 79 in UNCLOS III could
potentially diminish great power capabilities, this
document remained unsigned by the majority of maritime
powers. 80

The envisioned cooperation in UNCLOS went

beyond the actual level that these states were willing to
adopt.

Before the agreement was signed, post hoc

negotiations were required that lessened the discrepancy
between envisioned and actual cooperation.
Many neoliberal and legal scholars are unhappy with
this explanation.

They seek to demonstrate that there is

an autonomous international personality granted to
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institutions and legal principles. 01

For many, neorealism

does not allow such a capacity to exist for international
law and ins ti tut ions. 82

Anarchy, self-interest, and

power, appear unable to sufficiently explain notions like
sovereign equali ty 83 and the doctrine of res communis. 84
These concepts, visible in the international system,
suggest that something other than power and self-interest
guides the behavior of states.

Neoliberalism, and many of

the earlier realist thinkers, contend that rules, norms of
behavior, and membership in a 'loose' international
society allow for more robust explanations of
international cooperation than neorealism is willing to
allow. 85
The force of this well-reasoned argument suggests
reasons for accepting another paradigm in lieu of
neorealism.

However, it is also possible to include this

argument in the neorealist paradigm.

The underlying logic

of anarchy, considered a self-help system, does not
necessitate removing legal norms and practices.

All that

this logic suggests, is that when strategic issues
threaten the integrity of the state, maintenance of
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capabilities will trump considerations of legal norms and
institutional rules.
Kenneth Waltz's theory of international politics
attempts to provide the discipline with a parsimonious
theory, whose definitions are concise and whose actors
limited to only the most important. 86

Because of this,

roles, norms, and practices appear to be missing from his
view of the international system. 87

This is not the case.

Processes are accounted for in neorealism; although they
are provided only a modest role.
Unlike other theorists who envision the international
structure as a legal order above the states, 88 Waltz
considers law and institutions to be processes of state
interaction. 89

He is quick to point out,

"the difficulty

political scientists have in keeping the distinction
between structures and processes clearly and constantly in
mind.

09

° For Waltz, a conceptual structure can be created

separate from process. 91
a self-help system.

Such a structure is described as

For the purposes of the theoretical

enterprise, this structural concept is not endowed with
legal and institutional attributes. 92
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What benefit can result from such an abstract
structure?

Neorealism's limited theoretical principles

allow for a clarity of explanation.

Unlike many of the

institutional analyses, Waltz's structural dimension is
easy to understand.

Although its concepts come under

attack for various deficiencies, 93 rarely is Waltz
considered fuzzy in his concepts.
This is a pervasive problem with neoliberal analyses.
It is often difficult to distinguish between an
institution and any number of other concepts.

Often, the

institutional definition is so broad, it can be used to
describe all interactions between states in the
international system.

Haas, Keohane, and Levy, provide an

example of this fuzziness.

The authors suggest,

By 'institutions' we mean the persistent and
connected sets of rules and practices that
prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity,
and shape expectations. They may take the form
of bureaucratic organizations, regimes (rulestructures that do not necessarily have
organizations attached) , or conventions
(informal practices)."
A similarly broad definition is employed by Steven
Krasner in his study of regimes.
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Krasner notes that

regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations." 95
Defining institutions (or regimes) so broadly, these
authors deflect much criticism concerning their
discussions of cooperation.

However, the question must be

asked, what in the complex inter-relations between states
does not fall under the authors' definition?

If it is

indeed a valuable asset for a theory to explain, and even
predict, the behavior of states,

96

then this institutional

analysis does little more than muddy the waters.

Agreeing

with this assessment, John Mearsheimer has stated,
defining institutions as 'recognized patterns of
behavior or practice around which expectations
converge' allows the concept to cover almost
every regularized pattern of activity between
states, ... thus rendering it largely
meaningless. 97
Institutions, defined in the above manner, could be used
to describe any number of activities between states.

For

theorists wishing to explain a specific behavior of
states, it is important to limit conceptual definitions.
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Consider, for example, the prolific analyses of the
stratospheric ozone issue. 98

Much of the work on this

issue has established that without institutional
structures (including UNEP, the scientific community, and
non-governmental organizations) cooperative agreements to
protect the ozone layer would not have been possible. 99
Because institutions are defined so broadly, they can
include Peter Haas's epistemic community,1°° Karen Litfin' s
diplomatic norms and practices, 101 Parson's scientific
organizations (both national and international), 1° 2 and
Philippe Sands' s legal rules. 103

By incorporating all

these principles, the institutional thesis is able to
account for cooperation.

However, it remains extremely

difficult to understand the institutional explanation.
All of these theorists seek to demonstrate that
sufficient self-interest1° 4 and power relationships 105 alone
could not account for cooperation.

What all of these

authors seem to disregard is the extent to which the CFC
issue constituted a serious threat to the general wellbeing of large populations.

Neorealists argue that issues

with the potential to reduce state capability directly
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involve self-interest motivations.

Why has cooperation

developed on solving ozone depletion?

For neorealists,

cooperation developed because of sufficient self-interest
and progressed via institutional norms.
Without a theoretical discussion that properly
defines the institution, neoliberal works make giant
intellectual leaps.

The role of the institution in

explaining cooperation appears to encompass the majority
of the relations between states.

Theory, for the

international relations scholar, quickly becomes an
historical description of international environmental
ventures.

No longer does the theoretical endeavor purport

to explain or understand specific phenomena.
The position taken in this project is that a
structural explanation of international environmental
cooperation must precede an institutional description.
Without such a notion, institutional analyses remain fuzzy
and limited in their ability to explain or describe.

It

is important to understand that inclusion of institutional
processes does not undermine the use of neorealism.
Rather, a rich explanation of environmental cooperation is
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established by combining structural explanations with
institutional descriptions.
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NEOREALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

Increasingly, as theorists attempt to understand
international politics in the post-Cold War 1 system,
explaining cooperation becomes a litmus test for a
successful theory. 2

Neorealism, with its emphasis on

power politics, the primacy of the state, and anarchy is
considered unable to account for cooperation generally,
and environmental cooperation specifically. 3
true, it is indeed a problem.

If this is

Cooperation, in the form of

international legal agreements, is a regular occurrence in
international relations.

More than 130 multilateral

environmental treaties have been signed in this century,
over half since 1974. 4

The increasing salience of

environmental issues necessitates that neorealism provide
some explanation concerning the behavior of states on this
matter.
Applying the neorealist paradigm to a low-politics
issue, 5 such as environmental cooperation, becomes a
troublesome task.

Writing during the Cold War, Kenneth
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Waltz was concerned with military and security issues.
His theory emphasizes gee-political strategies and the
dynamics of polarity. 6

Cooperation, for Waltz, is

considered an anomalous occurrence in international
politics. 7

His theoretical framework suggests that

competition, rather than cooperation, results from an
anarchic global environment. 8

·

Only passing mention is

made of the need to seek global cooperation on
environmental matters.

In the final paragraph, of the

concluding chapter of TIP, Waltz notes that,

"Global

problems can be solved by no nation singly, only by a
number of nations working together." 9

This is a valid

statement, and welcome news for scholars wishing to employ
his theory to explain environmental cooperation.

However,

since the dominating logic, up to that point, revolved
around the enduring tendency toward competition, theorists
are left wondering how global cooperation is possible.
The door to understanding environmental cooperation is
left closed; but at least there is a door!
In order to open the door, and explain environmental
cooperation, it is first necessary to find the correct

53

keys.

A neorealist paradigm incapable of allowing for

cooperation in international politics will be useless in
the present endeavor.

Therefore, the paradigm will be

examined for "keys" or opportunities that assist in
providing an explanation of cooperation.

A careful

analysis of the paradigm will suggest that cooperation can
indeed develop in an anarchic system.
To understand the traditional neorealist's disregard
for cooperation, it is first important to understand their
preoccupation with competition and conflict.

Kenneth

Waltz employs the analogy of an oligopic market to outline
his structural dimension of international politics.
According to the oligopic theory of economics, firms are
in a self-help, laissez-faire system. 10
goal is to survive. 11
bankruptcy.

Their primary

If they do not, they face

Competition and rivalry dominate the behavior

of firms as they desperately seek to maintain their
market-share. 12

The competitive self-help system is

created by the co-action of these firms and perpetuates as
firms have no choice but to compete to survive.
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Waltz transposes this "structure" on to the
international scene.

States replace firms as the dominant

uniti 3 and international anarchy replaces the laissezfaire market as the ordering principle.i 4

The

consequences for states in anarchy remain the same.
states' number one priority is to survive.is

The

Like the

oligopic market, they must rely only on themselves to
ensure their survival.
system.

They, too, exist in a self-help

Because of this, states use power as a means to

ensure their survival.i 6

Power can be measured by looking

at a state's capabilities.

For Waltz, capabilities are

measured by considering
all of the following items: size of population
and territory, resource endowment, economic
capability, military strength, political
stability and competence. i 7
Again, thinking analogically, states (like firms)
compete in the international system.

There is an

uneasiness to join cooperative ventures.

Doing so would

increase efficiency but lead to interdependence.
become vulnerable if they specialize.is
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States

Therefore, the

system tends towards like states with varying
capabilities.
For the neorealist, the behavior of states is
predictable.

Competition trumps cooperation as states

seek desperately to survive in an anarchic "self-help"
system.

Robert Gilpin states flatly that the first

assumption underlying all realist thought is "the
essentially conflictual nature of international affairs ...
Anarchy is the rule; order, justice, and morality are the
exceptions." 19

Joseph Grieco contends that "realists

argue that states are preoccupied with their security and
power; by consequence, states are predisposed toward
conflict and competition." 20

He also considers that,

"international anarchy fosters competition and conflict
among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate
even when they share common interests. " 21
agrees with this assessment of anarchy.

Kenneth Waltz
He suggests that

A state worries about a division of possible
gains that may favor others more than itself.
That is the first way in which the structure of
international politics limits the cooperation of
states. A state also worries lest it become
dependent on others through cooperative
endeavors and exchanges of goods and services.
That is the second way in which the structure of
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international politics limits the cooperation of
states. 22
The stage is thus set.

The anarchical international

system is governed by rules of competition and conflict.
As states seek desperately to survive, they ignore
cooperative strategies and rely solely on competition.
For these theorists, anarchy inhibits cooperation.
This rather dogmatic view of the international
structure tends to incite fierce criticism. 23

Placing

heavy reliance on an abstract structural component, and
providing that component with the ability to dictate the
outcome of state behavior, appears to be deterministic. 24
The conflictual nature of international affairs is
predetermined by the structure of the system a priori the
activities of states.
This is a debilitating charge.

First, it renders

this form of neorealism useless as an explanatory theory.
There would be no need to investigate the behavior of
states since the theory already mandates conflict.
Cooperation would have to be viewed as an anomalous
occurrence in international relations.
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That it is

present, and proliferates in the system, would be
disregarded.
Second, the charge of determinism is difficult to
defend at a philosophical level. 25

Since the individual

is not prescribed any agency, the course of history is set
and the encounters of states, merely the works of destiny.
The claims of structuralism are uncomfortable, especially
for the theorist who considers free-will a component of
the self . 26

Pragmatically, the claims of structuralism

are highly confining and uninteresting.

It becomes futile

to study the components necessary for robust cooperation.
It is also illogical to contemplate the possibilities of
change in the international system.
This strict neorealist theory, based on the oligopic
analogy of the competitive market, appears incapable of
accounting for cooperation.

Further, it seems to stymie

additional philosophical inquiry.

Does this extinguish

all hope of providing a structural explanation of
environmental cooperation?

Not necessarily.

The last two

decades in the discipline of international relations have
been witness to a host of modified neorealist writings. 21
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Waltz's theory acted as a snowball placed atop a steep
hill.

As it slowly rolled down, it continued to pick up

more and more snow.

Coming to rest at the bottom of the

TIP, the theory,

hill, it appeared significantly larger.
can be considered the original snowball.

The excess snow

represents the neorealist paradigm, or world view, that
dominates the discipline today.
In this manner, the strict neorealist theory
developed by Waltz may be seen as "deeply and perhaps
fatally flawed." 28

However, the greater neorealist

paradigm may "continue to inform the community of
international relations scholars." 29

It is from this

greater paradigm that the keys can be found to unlock the
"cooperation door."
Recent neorealist writings rely less on the oligopic
analogy of competition and more on the logic of selfhelp. 30

In so doing, these moderate neorealists make no

claim about a competitive preference.
Glaser contends that,

Indeed, Charles

"self-help tells us essentially

nothing about whether states should pref er cooperation
over competition. " 31

Self-help means just that, a state,
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in order to ensure its survival, must look out for its own
security interests. Cooperation is an important form of
self-help. 32
Remaining true to the neorealist understanding of
state preferences, survival remains the states' number one
priority.

However, cooperation can now be viewed as a

means to ensuring that survival.

This is an important key

to a neorealist understanding of cooperation.

The state

is provided a measure of agency and may choose between
competitive and cooperative strategies. 33

Note how Arthur

Stein outlines the options for states,
Outcomes of international cooperation and
conflict emerge as a result of states' strategic
choices, which include both cooperation and
conflict as strategies. Nations are neither
inveterate cooperators nor defectors. Both
options constitute parts of states' repertoires
of behavior, and countries use both to ensure
survival and fulfill national interests. 34
Less reliance on the oligopic analogy and increased
emphasis on the logic of self-help removes charges of
determinism from the theoretical framework.

A "menu for

choice" 35 is now granted the primary actor in
international affairs.

It is possible to consider that
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where competition may be used to avoid losses in
capabilities, cooperation may be used in the same
fashion. 36

Charles Glaser contends that

although it is correct in stating that
uncertainty about the adversary's motives
creates reasons for a state to compete, the
standard argument fails to recognize that
uncertainty about motives also creates powerful
reasons for states to cooperate. 37
A brief review of recent literature concerning
"cooperation under anarchy" 38 suggests that cooperation is
a successful state strategy.

Game theoretic models

consistently demonstrate two important points for the
present discussion.

First, the models support the notion

that cooperation under anarchy is indeed possible. 39
Second, the robust nature of cooperation witnessed in
these models, reinforces the benefit claims of moderate
neorealist theorists.

Cooperative strategies invariably

win out over competitive strategies. 40
It should be added that although the paradigm grants
states the option to choose cooperation, they are not
given carte blanche with regard to the matter.

The

overriding logic of self-help and the security dilemma
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requires that states consider the ramifications of their
cooperative ventures.

States, like Waltz suggests, will

be wary of cooperative schemes that expose their
capabilities to harm. 41

Enforcement and monitoring

mechanisms remain under the sovereign control of states.
Indeed the highly constraining logic of self-help appears
to be followed religiously by states.

Elliot Richardson

notes that,
none of the existing environmental agreements
confers on an international institution the
power to set binding standards, issue and
enforce regulations, or prescribe sanctions. 42
The logic of self-help suggests that cooperation,
although present and possible in the international system,
does not lead to the diminution of state sovereignty.
States still seek to maintain and enhance capabilities,
limited cooperation is just another means to that end.
This moderate reading of structure not only allows
for cooperation, it makes it a viable, important strategy
for ensuring the security of the state.

Strict

neorealists will most likely be perturbed by such a
modification.

The highly touted parsimony of Waltz's
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structural definition 43 becomes clouded with state
preference calculations and a cooperation factor.
However, it seems warranted to surrender some parsimony
for more explanatory power. 44
This modified view of anarchy suggests that
cooperation can be accounted for by neorealism.

Moving

away from the blatant and disturbing nuances of
structuralism to a more balanced concern for the
ramifications and consequences of states under anarchy,
the broader neorealist paradigm survives the "cooperation"
test.

The door now appears open, and a structural

explanation of environmental cooperation can be outlined.
Three principles, present in the neorealist paradigm,
are necessary fixtures in a structural explanation of
environmental cooperation.

Without these three

components, it is unlikely that cooperation will be
achieved.

First, the state must be considered the primary

international actor.

Second, the cooperative venture must

"mirror" the power distribution in the international
system.

If the system contains a hegemon, its support is

necessary in order to produce substantial cooperation.
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Third, since the maintenance of capabilities is a
dominating concern, the benefits of cooperation must
outweigh the costs.

If these three principles are met,

the likelihood of generating cooperation on the issue is
dramatically increased.
I. The Primacy of the State
The primacy of the state is a central tenet of all
realist thought. 45

This special status given to states is

due in part to their claims of territorial sovereignty.
Sovereignty entails that a state has the power to decide
its own course of action, no matter how much it is
constrained by the system.

Waltz summarizes the

sovereignty concept nicely,
States develop their own strategies, chart their
own courses, make their own decisions about how
to meet whatever needs they experience and
whatever desires they develop.
It is no more
contradictory to say that sovereign states are
always constrained and often tightly so than it
is to say that free individuals often make
decisions under the heavy pressure of events. 46
Constraints on a state may hinder its ability to do
much of what it wishes to do.

To claim that states are

sovereign does not enjoin them with the power to do as
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they please.

States, as Waltz notes,

"may be hardpressed

all around, constrained to act in ways they would like to
avoid, and able to do hardly anything just as they would
like to. " 47
The primacy of the state is important in another
respect.

For the neorealist, the state is viewed as a

"unitary rational actor."

Instead of "opening" the

apparatus of the state, it remains closed. 48

Because of

this, neorealists miss the nuances of the state.

Pressure

groups, political infighting, and the opinions of the
citizenry, are assumed away.

However, because of the

underlying assumption in neorealist theory that states
seek to survive, state attributes are considered
unnecessary components. 49

No matter the ideological,

social, and political struggles that take place within the
state, the conditioning effect of anarchy requires that a
state choose the most rational course of action- the
course that best maintains or enhances its capabilities.
The component of state primacy has a distinct effect
on the theoretical emphasis.

Although the state is by far

the most dominant actor in international relations, it is
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by no means the only actor.

Non-state actors, including

international governmental and non-governmental
organizations, are given a "license to operate" in the
international system by states.

Unlike the neoliberal

model of cooperation, the institution plays a minimal role
in the activities of states.
Institutions provide information, enhance the
negotiating environment, and coordinate scientific
studies. 50

These activities do not compromise a state's

capabilities and do not require the state to specialize.
Institutions are sometimes necessary but never sufficient
entities for gaining cooperation on an issue.

States are

motivated by self-interest and the need for security.
That they use institutions to meet their security needs,
does not mandate an activist institutional role. 51
It should also be noted that an institutional history
of success on one issue does not entail success on several
more.

Many institutionalists seek to demonstrate that

certain institutional approaches to cooperation will
succeed in overcoming the inhibitions of states. 52
However, for neorealists, the dominating logic of the
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security dilemma suggests that the drive to maintain
capabilities will trump innovative institutional
approaches unless there is another reason to cooperate.

A

classic example of this difference is the current
employment of the "convention-protocol" approach. 53

This

approach was first developed by UNEP as a mechanism to
facilitate measures to protect the Mediterranean Sea from
a host of pollutants. 54

The first step in the approach is

the creation of an "umbrella convention" which simply
includes a "definition of terms, a description of the
geographic scope of the agreement, a general commitment to
co-operate, and an outline of the work that needs to be
done at future meetings." 55
then created to address,

Subsequent "protocols" are

"specific sources of pollution

and set forth plans for remedial action." 56
Officials from UNEP considered this mechanism
successful at getting states to cooperate.

Therefore, in

UNEP-coordinated negotiations after the MEDPlan, they
attempted to apply the same technique. 57
work in the case of ozone protection.

This appeared to
However, attempts

at achieving cooperation on climate change and other
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regional seas initiatives were complicated and
ineffective. 58

In neorealist terms, it is not the

institutional approach that warrants study; but rather the
issue itself and how states perceive the potential
problem.

If indeed the problem necessitates a solution,

the institutional approach provides a description of how
the cooperation is formalized.
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II. Power Distribution and the Presence of Hegemony
Kenneth Waltz considers the "distribution of
capabilities" among the states in the system to be an
important component to his structural theory. 59

The

structural explanation of environmental cooperation,
developed here, maintains this theme.

Agreements to

manage the global ecosystem must be developed with the
"distribution of power" factor in mind. 6 °

Further, if the

system contains a hegemon, successful cooperation will
require its acquiesence or active support.
A common assumption that leads the environmental
discussion forward is the belief that increased human
activity and the resulting "transformations of the
environment" 61 are global problems that require global
solutions.

As Waltz argues, global problems cannot be

solved by individual states. 62

The requirement that large

numbers of sovereign states must cooperate to solve
problems at the global level can be debilitating.

States

often have different formulas for achieving their security
needs.

A good example of this is provided by studying the

interplay between economics and the environment.
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It has been known for some time that environmental
issues and economic development are intrinsically tied to
each other.

The Brundtland Commission, articulates this

notion,
It is impossible to separate economic
development issues from environmental issues;
many forms of development erode the
environmental resources upon which they must be
based, and environmental degradation can
undermine economic development. 63
Because of the inability to separate economic
development from environmental issues, a range of complex
problems arise.

There is a tension created between the

North and the South.

The North is considered the

developed industrial economies of North America, Europe,
and the Pacific Rim. 64

These nations rapidly expanded

their economies throughout the last half of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.

Now in a position to slow their

economic growth, many of these countries are interested in
protecting the global environment.

The South, or

developing states of Latin America, Africa, and Asia,
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consider that it is now their turn to increase industrial
output and raise their standards of living.
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Because of

this, many international environmental issues split the
states into two camps, the North and the South.
Often, the high costs involved in reversing
environmental degradation or ensuring it does not take
place strains the North/South relationship.

When this

situation arises, many weak states are unable to comply
with the provisions in cooperative agreements.

Because of

limited capabilities, these states simply do not have the
power to cooperate.

Other states may be dissuaded from

cooperating after rationally weighing the consequences of
cooperation. 66

Both types of states require hegemonic

influence if substantial cooperation is to be achieved.
Consider how Waltz characterizes the position of the
United States in the international system,
Economically the United States is far and away
the leading power.
If the leading power does
not lead, the others cannot follow.
All nations
may be in the same leaky world boat, but one of
them wields the biggest dipper.
In economic and
social affairs, as in military matters, other
countries are inclined to leave much of the
bailing to us. 67
Although recent claims have been made concerning the
decline of U.S. hegemony,
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few will disagree with Waltz's
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characterization.

Especially with regard to environmental

matters, which may necessitate scientific knowledge,
technology transfers, and aid packages, 69 the position of
the United States is crucial.

The U.S. may be called upon

frequently to "bail" on behalf of the South.

Similarly,

the refusal to support a cooperative venture (even
tacitly) can have a deleterious effect on the outcome.
If a hegemon decides to support a cooperative scheme,
it may use its extensive capabilities to persuade other
states of the merits of joining in two ways.

First,

through benign incentives, hegemons can provide financial
"carrots" to states unable or initially unwilling to join
cooperative ventures.

Examples of this type of incentive

are technology transfers, development loans, and temporal
extensions for compliance.
Second, hegemons can wield a negative power and
coerce cooperation.

Coercing compliance is feasible for a

hegemon because of its extensive resource and economic
capabilities.

Coercion will usually take the form of

unilateral actions and sanctions.

The use of tariffs and

the creation of new technologies which outdate previous
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technologies can be considered coercive examples of
hegemonic power.

The neorealist also leaves open the "use

of force" option to ensure compliance.
III. Interest and the Cost/Benefit Analysis
There has been an implicit understanding in the
discussion above that a state can successfully weigh the
costs of cooperating.

It is now time to examine how a

state can indeed do just that.

The final neorealist

component necessary for the generation of cooperation is
the "benefit" component.

Accordingly, a state must

perceive it to be in its best interest to cooperate or not
cooperate on an issue.

Waltzian neorealism does not seem

to have a need for state preference calculations. 70
Instead, this strict neorealist theory suggests that the
structural constraints weigh so heavily on the state, that
the preferred state response is self-evident. 71

Moving

away from this version of neorealism, and allowing the
state more freedom to choose policy responses, creates a
need to explicate how the state is capable of choosing a
rational policy response.
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To begin, with regard to environmental matters,
states must perceive that a problem exists.

The

perception of a problem sounds like an obvious and rather
uninteresting concept.

However, perception of harm is

crucial if cooperation is to be engendered.
may help illustrate this matter.

An example

In the early 1970s, it

was technologically infeasible to mine rare earth
minerals, known as manganese nodules, from the ocean
floor.

Because of this, states did not perceive of a

problem with regard to nodule exhaustibility. 12

However,

as some states gained the capabilities of mining these
minerals, states began to perceive that there was an
exhaustibility problem. 73

It was this perception on the

part of states that created the environmental crisis.
Once a problem is perceived by the state, it has two
policy options.

First, it can cooperate with other states

and attempt to alleviate the problem.

Second, it can

ignore the concerns of other states and maintain its
current activities.

How does a state decide which course

to take?

74

Because a state is considered a rational unitary
actor, the interest of the state is judged by how a
problem affects state capabilities.

As has been

demonstrated above, states exist in a self-help system and
consider survival their number one concern.

As they seek

to survive, states are cognizant of the need to maintain
and enhance capabilities.
In order to judge which action to take on a
particular environmental issue, states must perform a
"cost/benefit" analysis.

Using the information that they

have obtained concerning the matter in question,
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states

weigh the costs of cooperating against the benefits.
Particular emphasis is placed on the certainty of the
problem and how that problem could reduce state
capabilities.
Consider how a cost/benefit analysis may reduce the
likelihood of a weak state cooperating on a global
problem.

When the costs are deemed to be so high that the

economic capabilities of weak states are severely
compromised, it makes little sense to cooperate.
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Maintenance of capabilities overrides the desire to
cooperate to protect the global environment.
The powerful actors in the system are in a similar
situation.

However, the question for these states is not

whether cooperation is possible.

The question that these

states must ask, is how much are we willing to finance
weaker state compliance?

As it has already been shown,

the hegemon may be needed to finance the cooperation of
weak states.

Powerful states must consider how serious

the environmental threat is to the maintenance of their
own capabilities.

If it is demonstrated that serious harm

may befall all states in the system, the hegemon, and
other powerful states, will consider the benefits of aid
to outweigh the costs.

The discussion above has established that the
neorealist paradigm is capable of explaining cooperation
in an anarchical system.

Further, three components to

understanding environmental cooperation from a neorealist
standpoint were outlined.

It is important to consider

that the state is the primary actor in international
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relations.

Continuing the neorealist emphasis on power,

it is considered necessary to involve the hegemon in a
cooperative agreement.

Finally, states must perceive of

the environmental concern and consider it in their best
interest to cooperate to solve it.

With the support of

these theoretical tools, it becomes possible to study a
number of international environmental agreements.
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THE U.N. LAW OF THE SEA III: POWER MANIFESTED IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA
On November 16, 1994, a process begun over twenty
years before culminated in the Third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea1 entering into force. 2
Nations from around the world celebrated the long and
arduous journey to the party in Jamaica.

The convention

was heralded as a new global constitution for the oceans. 3
It is a comprehensive and exhausting list of rules,
regulations, and promises by the states of the world to
manage the ocean resources.

The majority of the text

covers issues such as navigation, territorial sea limits,
contiguous zones, overflight matters, resource management
and dispute settlement mechanisms. 4

The text encompasses

200 single-spaced pages, divided into seventeen parts with
320 articles and 448 provisions. 5
While the agreement suggests that world states can
agree to a comprehensive and lengthy set of rules to
manage the oceans, it also suggests that power, self-
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interest, the maintenance of capabilities, and the logic
of self-help, continue to be important and dominating
factors in international affairs.

This study examines the

political struggle over just one part of UNCLOS III.

Part

XI provides insight into how U.S. hegemony radically
altered an innovative international regime to manage deep
seabed minerals. 6
The historical march to Jamaica in 1994 begins almost
three decades earlier.

As the maritime technological

capabilities of states began to increase throughout the
1950s and 1960s, state became acutely aware of the need to
regulate certain activities. 7

Among these activities, is

the mining of manganese nodules.

These nodules contain

nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese, 8 and can
potentially accent a state's economic capabilities.

The

problem for states is that these mineral deposits lie on
the deep seabed.

This area did not need to be regulated

until the capabilities of states made the mining possible.
Because there were no laws to regulate state activity
on the deep seabed, states in the system were in need of a
comprehensive regime.

Two options presented themselves.
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The United States, and a number of other western
industrialized countries, felt that the deep seabed should
remain, as it had historically, res nullius, or the
property of nobody. 9
faire,

Such a ruling would favor "laissez-

free-trade principles" 10 and allow those states

with the capabilities to mine to reap the profits.
Less developed countries (LDCs) promoted the idea
that the deep seabed and high seas should be considered

res communis, of the common property of all . 11

This

notion became the predominant viewpoint of a majority of
LDCs, and is best exemplified in Arvid Pardo's speech
before the U.N. General Assembly in 1967 espousing the
view that the deep seabed is "the common heritage of
mankind.

1112

It did not take long before the LDC majority in the
United Nations adopted the "Moratorium Resolution, " 13
dictating that states should refrain from exploiting the
deep seabed until international legal mechanisms were in
place.

The LDC majority in the United Nations was

beginning to make its presence known.
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Using the one-

state, one-vote mechanism, it appeared that "on paper" at
least, the notion of res communis was becoming the norm.
With this divisive situation unresolved, the first
session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference "was
gavelled to order in Caracas in 1974."u

The North/South

split over the deep seabed issue appeared insurmountable.
As two legal scholars would contend,
The distinction between res communis and res
nullius as applied to the deep seabed proved to
be irreconcilable at UNCLOS III. While
developed states espoused laissez-faire, freetrade principles, Third World states denounced
the fact that in the modern era, 'open access
meant equal access to the valuable resources of
the commons in name only.'
The philosophical
lines had been drawn for a protracted
ideological confrontation. 15
Indeed, the ideological confrontation took on added
weight when only three months after the first Caracas
session closed, the U.S. based Deepsea Ventures Inc.
claimed "exclusive mining rights" to 60,000 square
kilometers of the Pacific Ocean. 16
Throughout eleven heated sessions, 17 the debate
concerning the deep seabed would continue.

Finally, in

December of 1982, an overwhelming majority of U.N. member

89

states adopted the Convention.

Because of a "no

reservations" rule agreed to early in the negotiations, 18
states that ratified the document were committed to all
parts.

This included Part XI, the rules and regulations

to govern deep seabed mining.
Again, because of the sovereign equality rule 19 in
many U.N. conferences, the LDCs brokered a highly
idealistic document that ensured revenue-sharing and
technology transfers.

Titled "the Area,

embodies the notion of res communis.

1120

Part XI

Articles 136 and 137

proclaim the Area "the common heritage of mankind" and
deny states exclusive sovereignty. 21

Additionally, a

governing body, the International Sea-Bed Authority, is
charged with the sole responsibility of conducting
research 22 and defining mining policies. 23

Part XI also

mandates technology transfers to LDCs 24 and establishes an
international mining company,
all mining activities. 25

"the Enterprise" to handle

Finally, all administrative

functions mandate one-state, one-vote tactics which
strongly enhance LDC administrative influence.
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26

The response by the United States and several other
maritime powers was less than exuberant.

Many statesmen

and scholars alike considered that
while 117 states became signatories to the new
1982 Convention on that December day, many other
governments continued to harbor real frustration
and dissatisfaction with the final legal
product.
Included among these disgruntled
governments were several of the most important
international maritime actors, including the
United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and the
Federal Republic of Germany. 27
In the years following Jamaica, a series of
belligerent acts would be carried out by these powerful
states, in defiance of the U.N. Convention.
A number of these acts included the creation of
"mini-treaties" 28 to deal with many of the same concerns
dealt with in UNCLOS III.

Just prior to the 10 December

1982 signing ceremony, four major maritime powers signed
the Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to
Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed. 29

Two years

later, in Geneva, the U.S., Belgium, the U.K., West
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands, signed
an agreement to "prevent disputes over sites among
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companies mining minerals from the sea-bed outside
territorial waters. 1130
Calls for more drastic measures were sounded.
According to some,
considering the number and, in many instances,
the technological development, of the nonsignatories to the 1982 UN Convention, it might
be to their advantage at some future time to be
parties to a separate and comprehensive sea law
treaty. 31
These actions and policy discussions had an enduring
affect on the Convention and the Parties to it.

The LDCs,

victors on paper, were on the verge of losing all that
they had gained.

Early in 1972, Harold Brown noted that

the consequences of non-agreement will be
catastrophic only for those who have entertained
expectations quite out of keeping with present
trends in international relations. 32
It appeared that this early warning would prove true.
The number of states acceding to UNCLOS III was bringing
the treaty ever closer to an "in force" date. 33

After

such a date, non-parties would be legally free to engage
in deep seabed mining because of the pacta tertiis
principle in international law.
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With time running out for the LDCs, the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations initiated informal
consultations 34 in order to resolve the Part XI dilemma.
By bending to the demands of maritime powers, a
breakthrough agreement was soon annexed to the treaty. 35
The adjoining 'Agreement' 36 was adopted by a General
Assembly "vote of 121 in favor, none against and 7
abstentions" 37 on June 28, 1994.

To date, the document

has been signed by over fifty states- "including the
United States and virtually all other industrialized
states. " 38

The agreement is a classic example of how

envisioned cooperation must accommodate the power
distribution in the international system.
A number of significant changes were adopted and
annexed to the 1982 Convention.

Specifically, in the text

of the 1982 Convention, decision making in the
International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) , the international
organization charged with overseeing deep seabed mining,
was to "be carried out by a one-nation, one-vote
assembly. " 39

The 1994 agreement alters this process.

Presently, it is necessary to seek the "collaboration of
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the Council" before the decision of the assembly is
approved. 40

Alone, this would not have provided the

United States with additional power, because the Council
did not guarantee a seat to the U.S.

However, the

'Agreement,' "guarantees a seat on the Council for 'the
state, on the date of entry into force of the Convention,
having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic
product.'

That state was the United States." 41

The United States was also guaranteed a seat on the
Finance Committee and a seat in the Council "chamber." 42
These provisions further enhanced U.S. voting power and
control over deep seabed mining.

Additionally, the United

States achieved success in getting production limits on
the mining of manganese nodules lifted, 43 removing
mandatory "technology transfers" from PART XI, 44 and
curtailing the competitive advantage offered the
Enterprise (the supranational mining company of the
ISA)

45

In 1982, pursuant to the text of Part XI, the
distribution of revenues was to proceed via equitable
distribution
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taking into particular consideration the
interests and needs of the developing States and
peoples who have not attained full independence
or other self-governing status. 46
However, according to the 'Agreement,' any "surplus funds
would be subject, ... to consensus in the Finance
Committee. " 47

Since the United States was guaranteed a

seat on the Finance Committee, their ability to deal with
surplus revenues was enhanced.
In the wake of these changes, the 1994 Agreement
reinforced the maritime powers' preference to view the
high seas and deep seabed as res nullius.

The most

notable articles in Part XI, aimed at formalizing the
"common heritage of mankind" concept were rendered largely
ineffective.

According to one assessment,

The 1994 Agreement substantially accommodates
the objections of the United States and other
industrial states to the deep seabed mining
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention.
The Agreement embraces market-oriented policies
and eliminates provisions identified as posing
significant problems of principle and precedent,
such as those dealing with production
limitations, mandatory transfer of technology,
and the review conference.
It increases the
influence of the United States and other
industrial states in the Sea-Bed Authority, and
reflects their longstanding preference for
emphasizing interests, not merely numbers, in
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the structure and voting arrangements of
international organizations. 48
The issues involved in deep seabed mining, and the
historical events that brought the revised regime into
existence, suggest that power, the primacy of the state,
and the logic of self-help, remain important factors in
international affairs.

A neorealist explanation of deep

seabed mining can off er insight into the behavior of
states.
To begin, the activities of powerful states in the
system suggest that the primacy of the state is an ever
present feature of the relations between states.

As it

became apparent in the 1950s and 1960s that a new set of
rules to govern the oceans was necessary, the United
Nations appeared to be the most feasible institution to
use toward that end.

When it provided logistical support

and a neutral negotiating arena, the great powers did not
object.

After all, these functions of institutions cohere

with the logic of self-help.

However, as the U.N. began

to be used to enhance LDC capabilities, relative to those
of the great powers, cooperation broke down.
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In order to achieve final agreement, it was necessary
to return to the logic of self-help.

This logic suggests

that the maintenance of capabilities is an overriding
concern.

States, be they powerful or weak, will not enter

agreements that diminish capabilities relative to others.
Accordingly, the cooperative scheme that resulted
maintains or enhances the capabilities for all states
concerned.

The financial and distributive arrangements in

Part XI reflect the international power distribution.
They do not require a diminution of state sovereignty, nor
do they instill in the relevant international
organizations an autonomous regulative or enforcement
mechanism.
Further, the position of the United States provides a
good example of the need for hegemonic support.
start, the U.S. was hesitant about Part XI.

From the

Since its

economy and seabed mining capabilities are by far the
largest, the United States would have had to contribute
the greatest share.

Not until the "envisioned

cooperation" 49 of the U.N. and LDCs more closely matched
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the level of cooperation predicted under anarchy did the
position of the U.S. change.
Finally, the perception of benefits from deep seabed
mining changed from 1982 to 1994.

By the time that the

U.S. began to actively participate in the 'Agreement'
negotiations, it was apparent that "the anticipated
commercial mining of deep seabed minerals had receded into
the twenty-first century." 50

As it had become less viable

to mine the seabed, it became more viable for the U.S. to
acquiesce to the modified Part XI.
The extent of the cooperation in UNCLOS III suggests
that self-help and cooperation are not incompatible.
However, UNCLOS III, and in particular Part XI, also
support the claim that cooperation must reflect the power
distribution in the international system.

The limits of

cooperation with regard to Part XI and the annexed
Agreement are examples of self-help logic and the drive to
maintain capabilities.
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OZONE DEPLETION: COOPERATION AS SELF-HELP

Stratospheric ozone is an important component of the
earth's atmosphere.

Ozone has been found to act as a

"global sunscreen," blocking harmful UV radiation from
penetrating the earth's surface. 1

Early in 1974,

scientists began to understand that chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) had a devastating effect on the ozone layer. 2
Previously, CFCs had been widely accepted as a non-toxic,
cheap, and easily manufactured chemical product with widespread domestic and industrial applications. 3

Invented in

1928 by General Motors and DuPont, 4 their use as
refrigerants, propellants, and cleaning agents was
widespread and growing. 5

As the scientific data was

inconclusive, and the potential economic impact from
banning CFCs great, states did not act on the initial
scientific findings.
As reports estimating ozone loss continued to appear
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and "doomsday"
hypotheses were formulated,

6

states in the international
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system grew more and more concerned.

Evidence mounted

that even modest losses in the ozone layer would cause
increases in skin cancer, cataracts, and reduce the
effectiveness of the human immune system.'

The loss of

ozone due to man-made CFCs had the potential to reduce
state capabilities.

Fearing this, many CFC producing and

consuming states took unilateral action.

The United

States banned all non-essential CFC use in 1977. 8

Canada

and many European states took similar steps. 9
As concern grew, international institutions were
called upon by states to coordinate scientific meetings
and negotiating sessions.

In March of 1977, the United

States hosted a UNEP sponsored meeting of scientific
experts and government officials. 1 °

From this meeting

came the Coordinating Committee on Ozone Layer (CCOL) .
This committee, meeting annually from 1977 until 1985,
organized scientific information and prepared reports. 11
Within eight years of the first domestic control
measures, the largest group of CFC producers and consumers
met in Vienna, Austria and signed the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. 12
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As with UNEP's

previous "Conventions," Vienna provided the international
community with a framework agreement to coordinate
scientific missions and report findings.
insistence of the "Toronto Group"

At the

(the United States,

Canada, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and
Switzerland), an amendment was added to the Vienna
Convention enlisting the services of UNEP to begin
consultations aimed at an additional protocol by 1987. 13
Between 1985 and 1987, a number of important
political and scientific events took place.

In May of

1985, the British Antarctic Survey, a scientific group
stationed on Antarctica, published what would become known
as the "ozone hole" paper. 14

This report detailed a loss

of ozone of up to 40% over Antarctica. 15

Subsequent to

this report, NASA published the result of its Nimbus
satellite Antarctica mission.

This report noted an ozone

hole larger than the United States over Antarctica. 16
Additionally, NASA studies in 1986 and 1987, along with
WMO reports, confirmed ozone losses in the stratosphere. 17
Politically, the presence of the United States became
an important factor between 1985 and 1987.
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Having decided

on a coherent ozone policy in 1986, "the United States
assumed a strong leadership role in the negotiations for
the first time. 1118

By November of 1986, the U.S. position

on ozone controls was announced,
an immediate freeze in CFC consumption, followed
by phased reductions to essentially zero
(nominally, 95 percent reductions), with interim
scientific reviews to determine whether the
continued cuts were necessary. 19
As the deadline for a protocol neared, it appeared
that the U.S. was quite willing to flex its economic
muscle and demonstrate its hegemonic position in the
system.

During 1987, domestic legislation was introduced

calling for unilateral CFC reductions, and trade sanctions
against those countries that did not follow the U.S.
lead. 20
Throughout the interim period between Vienna and the
protocol, technological innovations occurred as well.
DuPont, the world's largest CFC producer, began research
into substitutes and announced that they would be
available by the early 1990s. 21

Other industry leaders

concurred and endorsed the idea of international
controls. 22
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The build-up of scientific, technical, and political
events between 1985 and 1987, culminated in the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 23
This document, signed in September of 1987, committed
parties to a freeze by 1990, 20% cuts by 1994, and a final
production target of one-half 1986 levels. 24

These

measures were accepted by all industrialized states and a
number of LDCs before the protocol entered into force.
Although time-lags are granted to developing states, at
least two large developing states, Mexico and Brazil, have
renounced the grace period.

Citing the need "to keep up

with their trading partners," 25 these states intend to
follow the same phase-out dates as industrialized states.
The two largest LDC states that produce CFCs, China and
India, acquiesced to the international regime after
pledges of money and technology. 26
Following Montreal, a number of new scientific and
technological issues became known. 27

As a result, tighter

restrictions and more immediate phase-outs were introduced
during negotiating sessions in London 28 and Copenhagen. 29
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Within two decades, the sovereign states of the world
joined together and banned a popular and economically
advantageous substance.

Undeniably,

The progress that was made, in dealing with an
increasingly menacing global problem,
particularly near the end of the 1980s, was
indeed impressive.
Few problems requiring state
cooperation on a global scale move from bare
recognition to something approaching solution in
less than two decades. 30
For the neorealist, the case of ozone depletion
offers a classic example of "cooperation as self-help."
No matter whether the state was developing or developed,
powerful or weak, producing CFCs or merely consuming them,
the potential harm from ozone depletion would affect it.
The behavior of states in the international system appears
to recognize this fact.
Of particular interest is the position of the
powerful states in the system.

Many European states,

including England and France, appear hesitant to alter
their economic capabilities during the initial debate
concerning ozone depletion. 31

As scientific knowledge

increased concerning the cause and consequences of ozone
damage, these states modified their respective positions.
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Further, the influence that the United States had on these
countries, appears to have contributed to their behavior.
The coercive suggestion of trade sanctions, made by the
U.S., may not have been the only factor in England and
France's modified stance.

However, it is perhaps wise to

note that on two previous occasions, the 1977 aerosol ban
and supersonic transport abandonment, 32 the United States
acted unilaterally.

The latter action was of great cost

to England and France. 33

These actions should suggest

that with regard to ozone depletion, the U.S. had a long
history of concern.
Certainly, the hegemonic position of the United
States appears to have played a large role in the swift
action that was taken on the matter.

During the Vienna

Convention, inclusion of the 'UNEP protocol amendment' was
due in large part to a tough U.S. stance. 34

Further, even

institutional theorists admit that "the final Protocol has
a fairly strong American flavor. " 35

It can be said with

some certainty, that had the United States not desired a
quick and effective response to ozone depletion, the
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matter would have remained unresolved for some time
longer.
Additionally, the position of the developing states
is not unexpected and mirrors the hypothesized neorealist
concern over the maintenance of capabilities.

LDCs were

at a real disadvantage during the early stages of the
negotiations.

Without the resources to develop and

produce alternatives to CFCs, developing states were left
little option but to continue to produce them.

As it

became clear that significant penalties would afflict them
if they attempted to trade with CFC-alternative producing
states, the LDCs lobbied for financial support. 36
The response by the powerful states exhibits a
remarkably rational approach to the ozone problem.

A good

example is the cost/benefit analysis contemplated by the
United States.

In 1986, officials estimated that almost

one million U.S. citizens would be killed in the following
ninety years due to ozone loss. 37
figures,

According to their

this would cost the United States approximately

one point three trillion dollars in reduced economic
capabilities.

It would only cost about four billion
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dollars in domestic transition costs to outfit the economy
with CFC alternative technology. 38

As well, the cost to

transition LDC states appeared considerably less than one
point three trillion.

The political outcome of the London

Amendments offers some insight into these costs,
London itself saw an extremely tense contest
between, on the one hand, the determination of
the major Southern states to get the best
possible financial and technological terms for
their participation and, on the other, Northern
political determination to get the South on
board without taking on vast and open-ended
financial and technological commitments. The
upshot was an agreement to establish a new fund,
initially of $160-240 million (the difference
being a $40 million tranche each for India and
China if they acceded, as they eventually did),
to be contributed by developed countries to help
developing countries cease to use CFCs. 39
Given the choice between continued ozone destruction and
assisting LDCs, the approach by the United States the
other powerful states appears well reasoned.

Further, the

acceptance of financial and technological rewards by the
LDCs coheres with the logic of self-help.

The LDCs, had

they not transitioned to ozone-friendly chemical
production, would have been left with an outdated and

111

inefficient technology.

This would drastically alter

economic development plans so crucial to LDC survival.
The behavior of states surrounding the ozone issue
represents an excellent example of how cooperation can be
an important form of self-help.

States in an anarchical

system were confronted with a problem that required
cooperation.

In order to maintain capabilities, and thus

ensure their survival, states found it in their interest
to agree to a phase-out of an entire chemical group.
Information presented to the states repeatedly confirmed
that ozone depletion was caused by CFCs.

Armed with

knowledge of the cause and the effects, simple
cost/benefit analyses resulted in substantial cooperation.
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CLIMATE CHANGE: COMPROMISED CAPABILITIES
In 1827, Jean Baptiste Fourier, a French scientist
and mathematician, recognized that the earth's atmosphere
traps the sun's energy just like a greenhouse. 1

Seventy

years later, the Swedish scientist, Arrhenius,
hypothesized that the burning of fossil fuels could
potentially raise the temperature at the earth's surface. 2
Little interest grew from the concerns of these
scientists.
available.

Evidence to back their claims was not
And, states were on the verge of rapid

industrial expansion.
Concern over greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remained
dormant until the 1970s.

Throughout the past three

decades, a steady increase in scientific data 3 and public
speculation4 has moved the climate change issue from
relative obscurity to international prominence.

Recent

studies suggest that even small increases in the
temperature of the earth can cause agricultural losses,
sea level increases, and forest deterioration. 5
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In order to deal with the possible threats caused by
the catastrophic events of climate change, the United
Nations General Assembly, in 1990, convened the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC) . 6

The INC mission was

to develop a comprehensive umbrella convention to deal
with climate change concerns by the time the 1992 United
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
(UNCED) convened in Rio de Janeiro. 7

Although the INC

managed to accomplish its task,
the Convention was a disappointment: despite
early hopes that it would seek to stabilize or
even reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by
developed countries, the Convention contains
only the vaguest of commitments regarding
stabilization and no commitment at all on
reductions. 8
Unlike the pressing matters in UNCLOS III and
stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change is "not only
distant in time but fraught with uncertainty as to its
possible consequences.n 9

For the majority of states in

the international system, including all of the powerful
states, climate change does not automatically entail a
reduction in state capability.
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Indeed, Russia

acknowledged that some benefits might befall it if small
increases in the global surface temperature resulted from
GHG consumption. 10

Increases in food production would be

likely to occur in China, Russia, and Canada as growing
seasons increased. 11

For the United States, "estimates by

the Environmental Protection Agency show that the net
effect on agriculture is uncertain, with the possible
range of effects lying between a net gain of $10 billion
and a net loss of $10 billion." 12
After studying all the potential costs associated
with global warming (including agricultural losses, sea
level increases, forest loss, and an increase in the need
to seek cooler environments) Wilfred Beckerman concluded,
it seems impossible to escape the conclusion
that even under pessimistic assumptions, the
annual cost to the world as a whole of global
warming associated with a doubling of C0 2
concentrations is likely to be almost negligible
by comparison with the value of world output
over the period in question.u
For only a handful of relatively weak and powerless
states do the concerns of significant climate change
appear to matter.

The most active group of states in the
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early negotiations, was the Alliance of Small Island
States. 14

According to Oran Young,

This bloc brings together about two dozen island
states in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the
Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas, as well as a
few others (for example, Bangladesh) likely to
be hardest hit by rising sea levels resulting
from global warming. 15
This group attracted the support of scientific
organizations and advisors. 16

Because of this support,

Young contends that the Alliance "has proven effective in
climate negotiations, despite the weakness of its members
in material terms. " 17
less.

Neorealists would expect nothing

Confronted with an environmental issue that would

significantly undermine a state's capabilities, and
possibly its very survival, states would be expected to
use all means available to them.
What is significant about the Alliance is not its
ability to lobby effectively in the negotiations, but
rather its inability to lobby for a series of important
articles in the final Convention.

Here, power politics

once again dictates the behavior of states.

The

Convention does nothing to create an 'insurance fund,'
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something that the Alliance desired in order to compensate
affected states for an increase in sea levels due to
GHGs. 18

Instead, the Convention offers a non-legal

remedy, noting that the
Parties shall give full consideration to what
actions are necessary ... to meet the specific
needs and concerns of developing country Parties
arising from the adverse effects of climate
change and/or the impact of the implementation
of response measures. 19
With only a tacit guarantee of 'full consideration,'
the Alliance achieved no legal means to ensure
compensation for GHG damages.

Further, the Alliance was

ecstatic that Article 4(4) was included in the
Convention. 20

This article was perceived as a major

victory because it states
the developed country Parties ... shall also
assist the developing country Parties that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects
of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation
to those adverse effects. 21
However, there is no mention of a particular degree
of funding 22 and "Parties seeking aid for adaptation costs
may have difficulty proving causation." 23

The effects of

GHGs are extremely slow, and the scientific information
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collected to date is inconclusive.

Alliance members may

be disappointed in the victory that article 4(4) provides
them.
The next clue that offers evidence of the
Convention's limited ability to enjoin cooperation is the
position of the United States on the issue of climate
change.

It is unclear how important the most prosperous

and powerful nation in the system considered the climate
change issue.

As the world-wide fervor over climate

change increased throughout the 1980s, the United States
instigated the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) , 24 hosted the first meeting of the
INC,

25

and pledged financial support for developing

countries. 26
However, other actions by the United States provide
evidence that climate change was not perceived as a
certain and debilitating threat.

Throughout the

negotiations, the United States resisted setting carbon
dioxide targets and timetables. 2 '

These issues "were

perhaps the most controversial in the entire
negotiation. " 28

The United States, not convinced of the
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scientific findings,

29

felt it was "premature, rigid, and

inequitable" 30 to establish strict targets and timetables.
Instead, the US argued that the Convention
should adopt a 'bottom-up' approach that
encourages the development of better
information, national strategies, and actions
plans. 31
The U.S. also made several statements to the effect
that they were unwilling to subsidize LDC efforts to
control GHG emissions. 32

Rather, the U.S. desired that

LDCs apply to the General Environment Facility {GEF) for
funding.

The GEF is controlled by the World Bank, managed

by developed states, and funded by voluntary donations. 33
Finally, many of the developing nations placed
economic development before environmental concerns.
Signaling a desire to maintain present capabilities, the
developing states were not willing to forego economic
development.

'Myopic' self-interest 34 appears to dominate

the LDC cost/benefit analysis.

With limited resources

available, and myriad other problems to deal with, 35 LDCs
were reluctant to deal with a long-term, and possibly nonexistent, environmental problem.
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A desire to ensure survival, along with an
uncertainty concerning environmental degradation as a
result of climate change, lessened the salience of this
issue.

No overwhelmingly powerful blocs formed.

Unlike

UNCLOS III negotiations, a North-South divide did not
develop.

The United States remained skeptical of the

scientific data and considered the costs of reducing C0 2
emissions far too high.

Wilfred Beckerman examines this

issue,
a 50 per cent cut in world emissions would need
a tax that would yield revenue in the USA alone
of at least $100 billion. The USA, which is
usually very reluctant to hand over relatively
trivial sums to the World Bank and other aid
agencies, would never agree to handing over this
ammount, which is about one hundred times the
current budget of the United Nations, to some
international agency to hand out to developing
countries for carbon abatement! And there must
be great doubts whether any international
agreement will get off the ground in the absense
of USA support, if not leadership. 36
Other powerful states were similarly hesitant.
England was wary of prescribing C0 2 targets, and often
frustrated other EC states like Germany. 37
states were also split.

Developing

Energy producing states, like

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were against higher taxes on GHG
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emissions. 38

China desired only a framework convention. 39

India appeared more interested in receiving financial
benefits like those won during the ozone negotiations. 40
In contrast, the Netherlands, the 'Alliance,' and many
African states, all potential victims of global warming,
wanted immediate reductions and financial support. 41
The paltry concessions at UNCED represent the
uneasiness that states have with the climate change issue.
Without concrete scientific knowledge, neither developed
nor developing states were willing to take appreciable
losses on short-term economic plans in order to reduce GHG
emissions.

The over-riding logic of the self-help system

resulted in few gains for weak states with the most to
lose, and no real losses for powerful states with little
to gain.

In the aftermath of the Rio Convention, no

further protocols have been developed and no international
negotiations have taken place,
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CONCLUSION

Among many in the field of international relations
there is an uncontrollable urge to view the nation-state
as locked in a desperate and losing struggle for its very
existence.

As natural resources are depleted, pollution

levels increase, and the global population of the human
species swells, theorists and lay people alike predict the
quiet end of the state-centric era.

Regimes,

institutions, and international organizations are
perceived as new and vibrant forces in the global struggle
for survival.

No longer is the international system run

by the rules of state sovereignty and power politics, and
conditioned by the overwhelming consequences of anarchy.
Much like the 1970s, when theorists foresaw the
inevitable economic interdependence of states,

1

an

ecological interdependence has gripped the imagination of
scholars and statesmen.

The state system is thus

considered incapable of dealing with global environmental
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issues.

It is now necessary to cede authority to regimes

and institutions for the earth.
This characterization of the current intellectual
climate in international politics bodes well for theorists
of the institutional persuasion.

Moreover, the increasing

numbers, and wide-spread support for, international legal
instruments and regimes provides evidence for just such a
world view.
Since the birth of neorealism in 1979, a steady
stream of scholarly works has attempted to provide the
discipline with structural explanations of polarity and
the power dimension involved in the international
political economy.

These works contradict much of the

logic detailed above.

Instead of witnessing an increase

in global interdependence, a diminution of state
sovereignty, and a reduction in the use of power politics,
theorists from this persuasion insist that the nationstate system is thriving.
Often ignoring environmental problems, or relegating
their importance to the status of 'low politics,'
neorealists have concentrated on the dynamics of global
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strategic issues.

The reluctance to sufficiently explain

environmental cooperation through the lens of neorealism
does a disservice, not only to the paradigm, but to the
discipline of international relations.
This project has examined the merits of applying
neorealist theory to environmental issues.

Using the same

principles involved in understanding strategic matters,
this endeavor demonstrates that neorealism can
sufficiently explain environmental cooperation.
The strict neorealist reliance on the competitive
In its place, a more

marketplace has been removed.

balanced discussion of the logic of self-help remains.
Here, cooperation exists as a useful and necessary
component of self-help strategies.

To supplement the

drive to survive, three principles necessary for
successful environmental cooperation have been
highlighted.

First, the primacy of the state remains a

central tenet of neorealism.

Second, agreements to

protect the global environment must mirror the power
distribution in the international system.

When that

system contains a hegemon, its support is often crucial.
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Finally, states, because of a desire to maintain
capabilities, will continue to rationally weigh the costs
of cooperating with the benefits that that cooperation
provides.
The presence of these principles have been
demonstrated in the eventual outcome of UNCLOS III and
ozone protection.

States instigated, controlled, and

finally accepted a number of policy options to govern
their behavior.

In keeping with the neorealist need to

account for the power distribution in the system, these
agreements were molded to reflect great power desires.
The role of the United States, as a world hegemon, is of
particular importance.

The U.S. successfully led the

revolt against LDC efforts in Part XI and coerced and
influenced world states to accept many of the ozone
provisions.
The lack of two of these principles in the climate
change matter, effectively abolished current hopes of
substantial cooperation to reduce GHG emissions.

Although

the state remained the primary actor, it appeared that
cost/benefit analyses favored non-cooperation for a
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majority of states.

The power distribution in the system

is reflected in the final "symbolic" agreement, but was
not reflected in the negotiations.

Few of the powerful

actors appeared interested in substantially curtailing
emissions.

The United States considered the costs of GHG

reductions to be extremely high.

Further, those states

with the most at stake, are some of the least powerful
states in the international system.
A structural explanation of environmental cooperation
suggests that power, anarchy, the state, and self-help
logic, remain important principles in international
relations.

That this is the case is certainly welcome

news for neorealism.

However, it also provides hope that

engendering cooperation can be better understood.

Being

cognizant of the need to protect the global environment

and remaining realistic about the type and extent of the
cooperation possible will allow for more successful
environmental cooperation.
Although it is beyond the scope of this endeavor, it
is important to analyze a greater number of international
environmental agreements.

The three case studies that
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were outlined in this exercise involve global
environmental problems.

Further work should examine

regional environmental matters, including both
multilateral and bilateral agreements to protect the
environment.

Regional examples provide insight into the

factors necessary for regional cooperation.
It is also necessary to develop a more thorough
definition of the 'state' in international politics.

With

an increase in the number of non-governmental
organizations and multinational corporations, comes a
desire to alter the effectiveness of the state.

There is

also a desire to 'open the box' and peer into the
apparatus of the state.

The structural definition of

environmental cooperation outlined above relies on a
picture of the state as a rational unitary actor.

To

avoid reductionism, the state must be seen as maintaining
or enhancing its capabilities.

Therefore, internal

attributes must assumed away.

When this is done

effectively, a structural explanation of environmental
cooperation appears to work.

Further inquiry into the

state may help alleviate the desire to 'open the box.'
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The politics of international environmental issues
are complex and complicated.

They require the active

participation of many state actors and potentially involve
every citizen in every state.

The importance of a safe

environment has never been questioned.

What has been

questioned is the ability of states to work together to
provide a safe environment.

A better understanding of the

motivations of states and the complexity of environmental
issues allows for a more realistic account of future
international cooperation.
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